It’s the exit relays that come under fire as they appear to be the source of malicious traffic as far as the victim is concerned.Note: You should only run a Windows bridge if you can run it 24/7. You can run bridges or pure relays without likelihood of interference because they only route traffic to & from sources or other nodes in the TOR network.
This is another reason for the ‘call to arms’ in adding more updated You are confusing bridges & pure relays with exit relays. Obfs3 is the new protocol in the obfuscation arms race as obfs2 has (I believe) been blocked in China, and the majority of bridges are not yet running it.
This makes it much harder for observers to block automatically. Obfuscated bridges attempt to circumvent this both by being hard to track down (there is no full list of bridges) and the traffic itself is obfuscated so as to not appear to be TOR traffic. The reason bridges specifically are of interest is that normal TOR relays are fairly open about being a TOR relay, and state censors can easily probe & block them. This in of itself suggests that TOR works for at least a subset of cases, because they’d not need to try & block it if they could monitor it. The new game played by censors is spotting encrypted traffic to TOR relays and automatically blocking it. (It is notable that TOR itself has never guaranteed privacy, only anonymity between source & destination – any TOR node could in theory snoop traffic). It goes without saying that if one wishes to avoid traffic sniffing before or in TOR that one runs some suitable end-to-end encryption. To answer your underlying question, TOR can’t protect against a global adversary that can observe all Internet traffic, because then you can correlate input into TOR with output from TOR and effectively circumvent it.īy comparison, if for example China can only effectively monitor the traffic across the Great Firewall, and TOR routes to an exit node in the United States that they can’t observe, then there is no way to trace an statement sent from that exit node to a Chinese citizen. It’s literally a few steps to configure & then it’s running, and it’s not in your home. TOR Cloud has the aim of providing easy ways to add more & harder to block entry points into the TOR network – a shotgun effect. Ap3:33 The reason why it’s ok to run bridges specifically in Amazon is that bridges are only ever entry points.
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